Clerk Fees: Legislation and Litigation by Ahearn, J. Marleen
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 25 | Issue 2 Article 9
1998
Clerk Fees: Legislation and Litigation
J. Marleen Ahearn
1@1.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
J. M. Ahearn, Clerk Fees: Legislation and Litigation, 25 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 315 (1998) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol25/iss2/9
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 
 
 
 
CLERK FEES: LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION 
 
J. Marleen Ahearn
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOLUME 25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WINTER 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NUMBER 2
 
Recommended citation: J. Marleen Ahearn, Clerk Fees: Legislation and Litigation, 25 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 315 (1998).  
315
CLERK FEES: LEGISLATION AND LITIGATION
J. MARLEEN AHEARN*
I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................... 315
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS.............................. 316
A. Attorney General Opinions 85-80 and 91-76.............................................. 317
B. Chapter 94-348 ........................................................................................... 318
C. Attorney General Opinion 94-60 ................................................................ 319
III. WFTV, INC. V. WILKEN ..................................................................................... 320
IV. TIMES PUBLISHING CO. V. AKE.......................................................................... 323
V. THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION............................................................................. 327
A. Article V, Section 15 ................................................................................... 327
B. Article II, Section 3 ..................................................................................... 328
C. Article I, Section 24 .................................................................................... 329
VI. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 332
I.   INTRODUCTION
Over the last three regular legislative sessions, the Florida Legis-
lature has attempted to clarify what the clerks of the circuit courts
are to charge for copying public records in their custody. However,
none of the bills have passed the Legislature.1 The perceived need for
such legislation resulted from passage of House Bill 2481 in 1994.2
Many clerks have construed this legislation as raising copying fees to
one dollar per page for all copies made by the clerks, not just for
copies of documents recorded in the Official Records books.3
In WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken ,4 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
held that section 28.24, Florida Statutes , requires clerks to charge
one dollar per page for copying all court records.5 The court reached
the rather disturbing and untenable conclusion that copying fees do
not interfere with the constitutionally protected right to access pub-
lic records,6 apparently irrespective of what amount might be
charged. In so holding, the Fourth District Court expressly embraced
the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Times Publishing Co. v. Ake ,7
which dealt with inspection and copying of court records. The author
                                                                                                                   
* Staff, Florida House of Representatives, Committee on Governmental Opera-
tions; B.A., 1970, Florida State University; M.Ed., University of Florida, 1973; Ph.D., Uni-
versity of Florida, 1979; J.D. with high honors, Florida State University, 1987.
1. See Fla. HB 1739 (1995); Fla. HB 1295 (1996); Fla. HB 39 (1997). These bills gen-
erally provided that except for instruments recorded in the Official Records, a clerk is to
charge 15 cents per one-sided page for copying public records not more than 14 inches by
8½ inches.
2. See Act effective June 3, 1994, ch. 94-348, § 5, 1994 Fla. Laws 2487, 2489
(amending FLA. STAT. § 28.24 (1993)).
3. See generally discussion infra Part III.
4. 675 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
5. See id. at 675.
6. See id. at 676; see also discussion infra Part III.
7. 660 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1995); see also discussion infra Part IV.
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contends that the Fourth District Court’s decision, as well as the
Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Ake, misconstrued or ignored
certain statutory and constitutional provisions.
Part II of this Article briefly summarizes certain statutory provi-
sions regulating clerks and the fees that they must charge for mak-
ing copies. It then details the relevant legislative history, as well as
applicable attorney general opinions that have interpreted these
statutory provisions. Next, Parts III and IV carefully examine two
court cases, one an opinion of the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
the other a decision of the Florida Supreme Court. These cases deal
in part with the power to regulate public access to court records. Part
V discusses three provisions of the Florida Constitution with regard
to the cases discussed in Parts III and IV, and in so doing raises se-
rious questions about the cogency of those holdings. Finally, in Part
VI, this Article concludes that the authority to set the fees that
clerks of the circuit court must charge for copying public records
rests in the hands of the Legislature, and that legislation is needed
to maintain and preserve public access to those records.
II.   LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS
Chapter 28, Florida Statutes , sets forth with particularity the
powers and duties of the clerks of the circuit courts.8 Each clerk is a
record custodian of the Official Records books.9 Official records
means “each instrument that the clerk of the circuit court is required
or authorized to record in the series of books called ‘Official Records’
as provided for in s[ection] 28.222.”10 Section 28.222, Florida Stat-
utes, provides that the clerk is the county recorder of all instruments
required or authorized by law to be recorded in the county the clerk
serves.11 Such instruments include deeds, leases, bills of sale, mort-
gages, notices or claims of lien, and judgments.12 Upon payment of
the service charge prescribed by law, the clerk will record all such
instruments.13
Section 28.24, Florida Statutes , sets forth the charges the clerks
of the circuit courts must assess for their services.14 Specifically,
clerks must charge one dollar per page “for making copies by photo-
graphic process of any instrument in the public records  consisting of
pages of not more than 14 inches by 8½ inches.”15 The controversy
                                                                                                                   
8. See FLA. STAT. ch. 28 (1997).
9. See id. § 28.222.
10. Id. § 28.001(1).
11. See id. § 28.222.
12. See id. § 28.222(3)(a).
13. See id. § 28.222(3).
14. See id. § 28.24.
15. Id. § 28.24(8)(a) (emphasis added).
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regarding what clerks must charge for records rests upon the inter-
pretation of the language “any instrument in the public records.”
As early as 1963, the Legislature required clerks to charge one
dollar per page for “[m]aking, by photographic process, copies of any
instrument recorded in the public records . . . of not more than 14
inches by 8½ inches.”16 In 1970, the statutory language changed to
provide a one dollar per page fee for “[m]aking copies of any instru-
ment in the public records , by photographic process . . . of not more
than fourteen (14) inches by eight and one half (8½) inches.”17 No
legislative history exists with regard to the change made in 1970.
Accordingly, one cannot determine whether the word “recorded” was
omitted inadvertently or intentionally, and if intentionally, what the
effect, if any, was to have been on fees charged.
A.   Attorney General Opinions 85-80 and 91-76
In 1985, the Attorney General was asked the following question:
Do the provisions of s[ection] 28.24, [Florida Statutes,] which
enumerate the charges to be imposed by the clerk of the circuit
court for services performed by his office, specifically s[ection]
28.24(8)(a), prescribing the fee for copying by photographic process
instruments in the public records , apply to all documents in the
clerk’s custody?18
The Attorney General advised that “it appears that the service
charge imposed pursuant to s[ection] 28.24(8)(a) refers to the photo-
graphic copying of instruments recorded in the public records and
not to all public records which the clerk may maintain.”19
The issue arose again in 1991 when the Attorney General was
asked:
Does the $1.00 per page copying fee specified in s[ection]
28.24(8)(a), [Florida Statutes,] apply only to those instruments re-
corded in the Official Records Book, or does it apply to all court re-
cords as well?20
The Attorney General again advised that the copying fee specified in
section 28.24(8)(a) does not apply to all court records, but only to
those records which have been recorded in the public records.21
                                                                                                                   
16. Act effective July 1, 1963, ch. 63-45, § 1, 1963 Fla. Laws 87, 88 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 28.24 (1961)) (emphasis added).
17. Act effective Aug. 1, 1970, ch. 70-134, § 5, 1970 Fla. Laws 459, 461 (amending
FLA. STAT. § 28.24 (1969)) (emphasis added).
18. 85-80 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 227, 228 (1985) (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 230.
20. 91-76 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 237, 237 (1991).
21. See id. at 240.
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B.   Chapter 94-348
In 1994, the Legislature passed House Bill 2481, which became
law as chapter 94-348, Florida Laws.22 Chapter 94-348 defined the
term “Official records” as meaning “each instrument that the clerk of
the circuit court is required or authorized to record in the series of
books called ‘Official Records’ as provided for in s[ection] 28.222.”23
“Public records” has “the same meaning as in s[ection] 119.011 and
includes each official record.”24 Public records is defined in section
119.011, Florida Statutes , to mean “all documents, papers, letters,
maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings, data proc-
essing software, or other material regardless of the physical form,
characteristics, or means of transmission, made or received pursuant
to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official
business by any agency.”25
Chapter 94-348 did not amend the one dollar per page copying fee
set forth in section 28.24, Florida Statutes . Furthermore, there is
nothing in the legislative history of chapter 94-348 to indicate that
the Legislature intended to otherwise modify the fee provision. Ad-
ditionally, a closer analysis of the definition of public records, the
definition of which supposedly expanded the application of the one
dollar per page copying fee to include court records, reveals no men-
tion of court records.26 This definition relates only to documents
“made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with
the transaction of official business by any agency.”27 Case law pro-
vides that “agency” does not include the legislative or judicial
branches of government.28 Accordingly, an “instrument in the public
records” for which the clerk may charge one dollar per page for
copying could only include, by way of the definition of public records,
official records and agency records, not court records.29 Nonetheless,
irrespective of the definition of public records, it is the author’s con-
tention that the Legislature did not intend chapter 94-348 to in-
                                                                                                                   
22. See Act effective June 3, 1994, ch. 94-348, 1994 Fla. Laws 2487 (amending FLA.
STAT § 28.001(1) (1993)).
23. FLA. STAT § 28.001(1) (1997).
24. Id. § 28.001(2).
25. Id. § 119.011(1) (emphasis added).
26. See supra text accompanying note 25; FLA. STAT. § 28.001(2) (1997).
27. FLA. STAT. § 119.011(1) (1997) (emphasis added).
28. See Locke v. Hawkes, 595 So. 2d 32, 36 (Fla. 1992); see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 71-78.
29. See Haynie v. Carlton, No. 95-2247 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. Nov. 29, 1995). The Haynie
court found that “the more specific statute establishing a schedule of fees which must be
charged by the Clerk for certain services does not apply to the copying of judicial records.”
Id. at 3 (citations omitted). The court also noted that section 28.001(2), Florida Statutes,
defines public records in relation to agency records under section 119.011. See id.
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crease copying fees for any records held by the clerk, regardless of
whether they were court records or agency records.30
However, even if the Legislature intended to expand the fee pro-
vision, its attempt could prove unconstitutional. Article I, section 24
of the Florida Constitution requires that certain laws affecting pub-
lic records appear in a separate bill not mixed with other law.31
Chapter 94-348 made many changes to other laws in addition to the
bill’s purported impact on public records by increasing copying fees.
Thus, the Florida Constitution may require that the provisions af-
fecting copying fees appear in a separate bill.32
C.   Attorney General Opinion 94-60
Following the enactment of House Bill 2841, the Attorney Gen-
eral was once again asked to address the clerk fees issue:
Do the recent amendments to Chapter 28, Florida Statutes, by
Chapter 94-348, Laws of Florida, require the clerk of the circuit
court to charge $1.00 per page for all public records?33
The Attorney General concluded that
while Chapter 94-348, Laws of Florida, would appear to subject
additional records to the service fee imposed by section 28.24(8)(a),
Florida Statutes, that charge is limited to the duplication of an
“instrument” . . . [and] would not apply to every public record in
the custody of the clerk of the circuit court but may be imposed
only for those documents that fall within the definition of an
“instrument.”34
The Attorney General opined that the newly added definition of
public records, which was defined to include each official record, ex-
panded the fee provision.35 However, such expansion did not include
all records held by the clerk, but only “instruments.”36 The Attorney
                                                                                                                   
30. The author was the House Committee on Governmental Operations analyst on
House Bill 2481 and was privy to committee and floor discussions, as well as discussions
with those who sponsored the legislation. To the author’s knowledge, no representations
were made that this legislation would result in increased fees. In fact, representations
were made that there would be no fiscal impact as a result of these provisions. See also
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., HB 2481 (1994) Staff Analysis 1 (Apr. 15, 1994) (on file
with comm.).
31. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24.
32. See 94-60 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 170 (1994). The Attorney General stated that “[i]n
addition to defining the terms ‘Official records’ and ‘Public records’ . . . Chapter 94-348
addresses a number of issues relating to the operation of the clerk’s office. In light of the
above constitutional mandate, the Legislature may have inadvertently rendered the act
vulnerable to attack.” Id. at 171.
33. Id. at 170-71.
34. Id. at 173.
35. See id.
36. Id.
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General then relied upon opinion 85-90 for the definition of instru-
ment and concluded that “[t]he Legislature, however, may wish to
consider defining the term ‘instrument’ for purposes of Chapter 28,
Florida Statutes, to remove any ambiguity which may attach by its
use in section 28.24(8)(a), Florida Statutes.”37
III.   WFTV, INC. V. WILKEN
WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken38 arose when the Clerk of the Circuit Court
for Palm Beach County, Florida began charging one dollar per page
for copies of court records.39 Prior to the enactment of House Bill
2481, the clerk had only charged one dollar per page for documents
recorded in the Official Records.40 The clerk asserted that charging
one dollar per page for copying all court records was consistent with
section 28.24(8)(a), Florida Statutes,41 which requires a copying fee of
one dollar per page for any instrument in the public records of not
more than fourteen inches by eight and one-half inches.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with the clerk that
limiting the phrase “instruments in the public records” to documents
recorded in the Official Records would be inconsistent with chapter
94-348’s newly provided definitions of official records and public rec-
ords.42 Accordingly, the court held that the one dollar per page copy-
ing fee codified at section 28.24(8)(a) was applicable to court rec-
ords.43
The court further stated that if section 28.24(8) had not encom-
passed court records, then the fee provisions in section 119.07(1)(a)
would have been applicable .44 Section 119.07(1)(a) requires the cus-
todian of a public record to furnish “a copy or a certified copy of the
record upon payment of the fee prescribed by law or, if a fee is not
prescribed by law, for duplicated copies of not more than 14 inches
by 8½ inches, upon payment of not more than 15 cents per one-sided
copy.”45 The Fourth District Court’s recognition that but for section
28.24(8), provisions in section 119.07(1) would be applicable to
copying court records seems antithetical to the Florida Supreme
Court’s opinion in Times Publishing Co. v. Ake.46
                                                                                                                   
37. Id.
38. 675 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
39. See id. at 675.
40. See id.
41. See id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 28.24(8)(a) (1997).
42. See WFTV, 675 So. 2d at 678.
43. See id. at 679.
44. See id. at 677.
45. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(1)(a) (1997).
46. 660 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1995).
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In Ake, the Florida Supreme Court, quoting the district court,
noted that the clerk “is immune from the supervisory authority of
the Legislature. Thus, chapter 119 does not apply to the clerk  . . . [as
records custodian for the court] and the access to judicial records un-
der his control is governed exclusively by rule 2.051 [of the Rules of
Judicial Administration].”47 The WFTV court did not adequately re-
solve the inherent conflict between its position and the Florida Su-
preme Court’s holding in Ake, even though the district court ex-
pressly embraced the Ake opinion.
The district court also held, contrary to WFTV’s position, that
“charging a fee for copying judicial records does not interfere with
appellants’ constitutionally protected right to access.”48 In other
words, the charge imposed to copy court records is inconsequential to
the right of access. This conclusion is disconcerting. If the Fourth
District Court was equating “access” with the right to inspect, then
copying fees would be irrelevant. However, this reasoning ignores
both existing case law and article I, section 24 of the Florida Consti-
tution, which clearly provide that the right of access includes the
right to inspect and the right to copy.49
If the clerk were required to charge fifty dollars a page for copying
court records, would the court continue to hold that charging a fee
for copying judicial records does not interfere with the constitution-
ally guaranteed right to access judicial records? Is the court in
WFTV suggesting that an unreasonable fee could not be challenged
as a violation of article I, section 24? Or, is the court simply trying to
say that the amount of the fee, one dollar per page, does not interfere
with the right of access? If the latter interpretation is correct, then
the court has determined that the fee is not unreasonable and there-
fore not unconstitutional. This would seem a logical interpretation,
except for the court’s contradictory comment that “[w]e do not ad-
dress appellants’ contention that the charge of $1.00 per page is un-
reasonable because this point was not raised in the trial court.”50
The court’s comment suggests that if the reasonableness of the
one dollar per page copying fee were properly before the court, then
the issue could be reached. However, the court also stated that a fee
for copying judicial records does not interfere with the constitution-
ally protected right to access public records. This raises the question
                                                                                                                   
47. Id. at 257 (emphasis added).
48. WFTV, 675 So. 2d at 676.
49. See Fuller v. State ex rel. O’Donnell, 154 Fla. 368, 370, 17 So. 2d 607, 608 (1944);
see also infra text accompanying notes 111-14.
50. WFTV, 675 So. 2d at 675-76 n.1.
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as to the grounds available to challenge the reasonableness of a
copying fee.51
The WFTV court cited Roesch v. State52 to support its proposition
that “charging a fee for copying judicial records does not interfere
with appellants’ constitutionally protected right to access.”53 How-
ever, the court does not identify what “constitutionally protected
right to access” it is referencing. Therefore, one must presume from
the context of the case that the court is referring to article I, section
24 of the Florida Constitution, which provides for the public’s right
to inspect and copy public records.
In Roesch, the defendant was convicted of three crimes and sen-
tenced to prison in 1990.54 His convictions and sentences were af-
firmed in 1991.55 Thereafter, Roesch filed a motion to compel the
state attorney to turn over his file pursuant to chapter 119, Florida
Statutes.56 The court held that section 119.07(1)(a) requires the court
to charge a fee and that there is no provision in chapter 119 for pro-
viding copies of the public records to indigent persons free of
charge.57 In 1990, section 119.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes , required
“payment of 15 cents per one-sided copy.”58 However, the mandatory
fee provision was amended in 1991 by the enactment of Senate Bill
422.59 The law removed the mandatory nature of the fee provision,
amending section 119.07(1) to now read “upon payment of not more
than 15 cents per one-sided copy.”60 The Fourth District Court failed
to note this significant change in the law when relying on Roesch as
legal precedent.
Furthermore, the Roesch court relied upon Yanke v. State.61 In
Yanke, the court determined that an incarcerated indigent defendant
was not “entitled to the documents free of charge under applicable
                                                                                                                   
51. If state constitutional provisions are ignored, there are federal constitutional
provisions protecting access to judicial records. See Applications of NBC, Inc. v. Presser,
828 F.2d 340, 345 (6th Cir. 1987) (asserting that there is a First Amendment right of ac-
cess to documents and records pertaining to court proceedings); Oregonian Publ’g Co. v.
United States, 920 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that there is a qualified First
Amendment right of access to court proceedings and documents); Sentinel Communica-
tions v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189, 1205 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that “[t]he government may
not profit by imposing licensing or permit fees on the exercise of first amendment rights . .
. and is prohibited from raising revenue under the guise of defraying its administrative
costs”).
52. 633 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1993).
53. WFTV, 675 So. 2d at 676.
54. See Roesch, 633 So. 2d at 1.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 2.
58. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(1)(a) (Supp. 1990).
59. See Act effective May 28, 1991, ch. 91-130, § 1, 1991 Fla. Laws 1305, 1305-06
(amending FLA. STAT. § 119.07(1)(a) (1989)).
60. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(1)(a) (1997) (emphasis added).
61. 588 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
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principles of due process relating to a criminal proceeding.”62 How-
ever, the author submits that “applicable principles of due process
relating to a criminal proceeding” have nothing to do with the right
to access public records guaranteed by article I, section 24 of the
Florida Constitution. In fact, that constitutional provision did not
become effective until 1993, after the Yanke decision.63 Finally,
though the court rendered the Roesch opinion almost five months af-
ter the effective date of article I, section 24,64 the court failed to
mention that constitutional provision. Thus, the applicability and
enforcement of article I, section 24 were never considered in the
Roesch and Yanke cases. Accordingly, the WFTV court failed to en-
gage in a relevant analysis of existing law when it relied on these
cases to conclude that charging a fee for copying judicial records does
not interfere with the right to inspect and copy records.
IV.   TIMES PUBLISHING CO. V. AKE
Despite the Fourth District Court’s arguably erroneous conclusion
in WFTV, the court was fully cognizant of the Legislature’s authority
to set copying fees for court records. However, the same cannot be
said for the Florida Supreme Court in Times Publishing Co. v. Ake.65
In Ake, the Times Publishing Company made three written re-
quests to inspect and copy certain court records in the custody of
Richard Ake, Clerk of the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County.66
Ake refused to make the records available to Times Publishing and
filed for a declaratory judgment as to whether “the records of the
Court in the custody of the Clerk are subject to Chapter 119 under
the separation of powers doctrine.”67
After proceedings began in Ake, the Florida Supreme Court
adopted Rule of Judicial Administration 2.051, which provides a
framework for determining public access to judicial records.68 This
rule provides specific exemptions for certain judicial records and sets
forth criteria that must be met for a court to keep a record confiden-
tial.69 Rule 2.051 also provides a process for review when a court de-
nies access to a record.70
                                                                                                                   
62. Id. at 5.
63. See FLA. CONST. art I, § 24 (effective July 1, 1993).
64. See id.
65. 660 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1995).
66. See id. at 255.
67. Id. at 256 (footnote omitted).
68. See FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.051.
69. See id.
70. See id. The WFTV court determined that “[i]n adopting the comprehensive provi-
sions of [R]ule 2.051 governing access to court records, our supreme court did not adopt
any provisions dealing with the costs to be charged to obtain copies of those records.”
WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken, 675 So. 2d 674, 676 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). There are those, however,
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After the adoption of Rule 2.051, Ake advised the court that the
rule resolved the issue raised in the first count of his declaratory ac-
tion.71 While the supreme court did not specify the contents of the
first count, the first enumerated issue in the declaratory action was
whether the records of the court in the custody of the clerk were
subject to chapter 119, Florida Statutes , under the separation of
powers doctrine.72 How the adoption of Rule 2.051 resolved this issue
is unclear.
According to the court, all remaining issues were resolved by the
parties, except for Times Publishing’s claim for attorneys’ fees pur-
suant to section 119.12, Florida Statutes , which was the “sole issue
on appeal.”73 Section 119.12 provides:
(1) If a civil action is filed against an agency to enforce the provi-
sions of this chapter and if the court determines that such agency
unlawfully refused to permit a public record to be inspected, exam-
ined, or copied, the court shall assess and award, against the
agency responsible, the reasonable costs of enforcement including
reasonable attorneys’ fees.
(2) Whenever an agency appeals a court order requiring it to per-
mit inspection of records pursuant to this chapter and such order
is affirmed, the court shall assess a reasonable attorney’s fee for
the appeal against such agency.74
“Agency” is defined in Chapter 119, Florida Statutes, to mean:
any state, county, district authority, or municipal officer, depart-
ment, division, board, bureau, commission, or other separate unit
of government created or established by law including, for the pur-
poses of this chapter, the Commission on Ethics, the Public Service
Commission, and the Office of Public Counsel, and any other public
or private agency, person, partnership, corporation, or business
entity acting on behalf of any public agency.75
The Florida Supreme Court approved the decision of the Second
District Court.76 The district court had held that clerks, as custodi-
ans of court records, were not subject to the attorneys’ fees provi-
sions in section 119.12, Florida Statutes , because chapter 119 ap-
                                                                                                                   
who would argue that Rule 2.051 does indirectly address fees for judicial records. Rule
2.051 provides that “[r]equests and responses to requests for access to public records un-
der this rule shall be made in a reasonable manner.” FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.051. The court
in Haynie v. Carlton reasoned that Rule 2.051 simply requires a reasonable fee for copying
court records. See Haynie v. Carlton, No. 95-2247 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. Nov. 29, 1995).
71. See Ake, 660 So. 2d at 256.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 255.
74. FLA. STAT. § 119.12 (1997) (emphasis added).
75. Id. § 119.011(2).
76. See Ake, 660 So. 2d at 257.
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plies solely to agencies.77 The district court had reasoned that “the
judiciary, as a coequal branch of government, is not an ‘agency’ [as
defined in chapter 119] subject to the supervision or control by an-
other coequal branch of government.”78
The Florida Supreme Court also responded to the following certi-
fied question: “ARE THE COURT RECORDS MAINTAINED BY
THE CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT SUBJECT TO THE IN-
SPECTION AND COPYING REQUIREMENTS OF CHAPTER 119
OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES?”79
The court answered that court records held by the clerk of the cir-
cuit court are not subject to the inspection and copying requirements
of chapter 119, Florida Statutes .80 The court quoted with approval
the Second District Court’s opinion that:
[t]he clerk, when acting in the exercise of his duties derived from
article v, is acting as an arm of the court and, as such, is immune
from the supervisory authority of the legislature. Thus, chapter
119 does not apply to the clerk in such capacity and the access to
judicial records under his control is governed exclusively by rule
2.051 [of the Rules of Judicial Administration].81
Does the court really mean to suggest that the entirety of chapter
119 is inapplicable to the judiciary and, more specifically, to the
clerks of the circuit courts? Clearly, most provisions of chapter 119
expressly apply to agencies, and thus, by way of case law, would not
apply to the judicial branch. However, not all of the provisions in
                                                                                                                   
77. See Times Publ’g Co. v. Ake, 645 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).
78. Id. at 1004. The Second District Court referred to the judicial branch as a “co-
equal” branch of government and cited the Florida Constitution in support of that propo-
sition. See id. Contrary to those assertions, the Florida Constitution does not state that
the three branches of government are “co-equal.” It simply divides state government into
three branches. As to the federal government, our founding fathers noted the disparity in
the three branches of government, or as they called them, the three departments of gov-
ernment. Madison noted that “[t]he legislative department derives a superiority in our
governments . . . . As the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the
people . . . and in all, a prevailing influence over the pecuniary rewards of those who fill
the other departments.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison). However, “it is not
possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defence. In republican govern-
ment the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51
(James Madison). Hamilton also acknowledged the non-equal status of the branches of
government:
The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by
which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary
on the contrary has no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direc-
tion either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no ac-
tive resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will
but merely judgment . . . . It proves incontestibly that the judiciary is beyond
comparison the weakest of the three departments . . . .
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
79. Ake, 660 So. 2d at 255.
80. See id. at 257.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
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chapter 119 are so limited. For example, section 119.085 addresses
remote electronic access to public records. It provides:
As an additional means of inspecting, examining, and copying
public records of the executive branch, judicial branch, or any po-
litical subdivision of the state, public records custodians may pro-
vide access to records by remote electronic means. Unless other-
wise required by law, the custodian may charge a fee for remote
electronic access, granted under a contractual arrangement with a
user, which fee may include the direct and indirect costs of provid-
ing such access. Fees for remote electronic access provided to the
general public shall be in accordance with the provisions of
s[ection] 119.07(1).82
Section 119.085 clearly limits the fee that the judicial branch may
charge for remote electronic access to court records pursuant to a
contractual arrangement. Furthermore, it requires the judicial
branch to comply with section 119.07(1) with regard to the fees
charged to the public for remote electronic access.83
Has the Florida Supreme Court, in Ake, indirectly held that sec-
tion 119.085 is unconstitutional, even though that particular statu-
tory provision of law was not before the court for review? Does this
mean that now the judicial branch can set its own fees for remote
electronic access to court records?
It is possible that the Florida Supreme Court simply overstated
the case when making the sweeping generalization that chapter 119
does not apply to the clerks of the circuit courts. One could argue a
narrower construction of the court’s holding. That is, because the
question certified to the court only addressed the inspection and
copying requirements of chapter 119, then only those requirements
are inapplicable to the clerks of the circuit courts, as well as the at-
torneys’ fees requirement that the court otherwise expressly held in-
applicable. Nonetheless, even this interpretation ignores the re-
quirements of article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution.84
However, if Ake was actually intended to stand for the proposition
that the clerks of the circuit courts are immune from the supervisory
authority of the Legislature, that the “court has the inherent and ex-
clusive constitutional authority over its agencies who act in its be-
half,”85 and that access to judicial records is governed exclusively by
Rule 2.051, then the Florida Supreme Court has made an egregious
error. It has either ignored or misconstrued critical constitutional
                                                                                                                   
82. FLA. STAT. § 119.085 (1997) (emphasis added).
83. See id.
84. See discussion infra Part V.C.
85. Times Publ’g Co. v. Ake, 645 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (emphasis
added).
1998]                        CLERK FEES 327
provisions found in article V, section 15; article II, section 3; and ar-
ticle I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution.
V.   THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION
A.   Article V, Section 15
Article V, section 15 of the Florida Constitution provides:
Section 15. Attorneys; admission and discipline. — The supreme
court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of
persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admit-
ted.86
In Ake, the Florida Supreme Court, quoting the lower court, ad-
vised that “[t]he clerk, when acting in the exercise of his duties de-
rived from article V is acting as an arm of the court and, as such, is
immune from the supervisory authority of the legislature.”87 The
Second District Court divined this conclusion from its more general
assertion that “[t]he court has the inherent and exclusive constitu-
tional authority over its agencies who act in its behalf.”88 In support
of this assertion, the Second District Court cited In re Florida Bar ,89
which concerns whether the records of a committee of the Florida
Bar were subject to chapter 119.90 The Florida Supreme Court, in In
re Florida Bar, concluded that these records were not subject to
chapter 119 because “the Florida Constitution by its express terms
vests exclusive jurisdiction in this Court to regulate the admission of
persons to the practice of law.”91 However, the fact that the Florida
Constitution specifically grants the supreme court exclusive juris-
diction to regulate the admission and discipline of lawyers does not
support the assertion that the supreme court has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the clerks of the circuit courts with regard to access to pub-
lic records.
Nothing in article V, or for that matter the entire Florida Consti-
tution, grants exclusive jurisdiction over the clerks of the circuit
courts to the judiciary. The Florida Constitution can grant exclusive
jurisdiction, as it did with respect to the regulation of lawyers, but
no such language exists regarding clerks. Accordingly, for the Flor-
ida Supreme Court to announce such exclusive jurisdiction is to
overstep its constitutional authority.92
                                                                                                                   
86. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15.
87. Times Publ’g Co. v. Ake, 660 So. 2d 255, 257 (Fla. 1995).
88. Ake, 645 So. 2d at 1005.
89. 398 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1981).
90. See id.
91. Id. at 447.
92. This is not the first time the court has carved out exclusive jurisdiction where
none existed. In In re Clarification of Florida Rules of Practice and Procedure, 281 So. 2d
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B.   Article II, Section 3
Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution provides:
Section 3. Branches of government.—The powers of the state gov-
ernment shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial
branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any
powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless ex-
pressly provided herein.93
Unfortunately, the Florida Supreme Court did not specifically cite
or discuss article II, section 3, when it rendered its decision in Ake.
Nonetheless, the separation of powers doctrine played a significant
role in the decision. The court impliedly referenced the doctrine by
citing Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, and F 94 in support of the
proposition that the judiciary is not subject to the supervision or con-
trol of another branch of government.95 Chiles dealt exclusively with
separation of powers issues.96 Additionally, Ake’s declaratory com-
plaint asked for judgment as to whether “the records of the Court in
the custody of the Clerk are subject to Chapter 119 under the separa-
tion of powers doctrine .”97 Finally, the certified question to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court was nearly identical to the language in Ake’s de-
claratory complaint although the separation of powers language was
omitted.98
The Florida Supreme Court, in affirming the Second District
Court’s opinion, concluded that
                                                                                                                   
204 (Fla. 1973), the court noted that the new constitutional provision—article V, section
2(a)—authorized the supreme court to adopt rules regarding “practice and procedure in all
courts.” Id. at 204. The court added that the Legislature had the constitutional authority
to repeal such rules by a two-thirds vote, but concluded that the Legislature “has no con-
stitutional authority to enact any law relating to practice and procedure.” Id.
However, nothing in the Florida Constitution provides such exclusive jurisdiction. As
noted by Ernest Means, had the framers of that constitutional provision intended exclu-
sive jurisdiction in the court they could have clearly so provided. See Ernest Means, The
Power to Regulate Practice and Procedure in the Florida Courts, 54 FLA. B.J., 276, 279
(1980).
[I]t is evident that the framers of the revision knew how to vest exclusive
authority when they so intended. Section 15 of the same article forthrightly
provides that the court “shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the ad-
mission of persons to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admit-
ted.”
Id. at 279.
93. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added). This constitutional provision is often
misquoted as providing for three “co-equal” branches of government though the term “co-
equal” is not used in the Florida Constitution. See supra note 78.
94. 589 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1991).
95. See Times Publ’g Co. v. Ake, 660 So. 2d 255, 257 (Fla. 1995).
96. See Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 263.
97. Ake, 660 So. 2d at 256 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
98. See id. at 255. For the text of the certified question, see supra text accompanying
note 79.
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the clerks of the circuit courts, when acting under the authority of
their article V powers concerning judicial records and other mat-
ters relating to the administrative operation of the courts, are an
arm of the judicial branch and are subject to the oversight and con-
trol of the Supreme Court of Florida, rather than the legislative
branch.99
By implication, the supreme court relies upon the separation of
powers doctrine found in article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitu-
tion in an attempt to establish exclusive jurisdiction regarding ac-
cess to judicial records. However, the court ignored a critical part of
article II, section 3, which provides for separation of powers unless
otherwise expressly provided  in the Florida Constitution. Article I,
section 24 expressly provides otherwise and therefore governs.
C.   Article I, Section 24
Article I, section 24 of the Florida Constitution provides:
Section 24. Access to public records and meetings.—
(a) Every person has the right to inspect or copy any public rec-
ord . . . except with respect to records exempted pursuant to this
section . . . . This section specifically includes the legislative, ex-
ecutive, and judicial branches of government . . . .
. . . .
(c) . . . . The legislature, however, may provide by general law for
the exemption of records from the requirements of subsection (a) . .
. .
(d) All laws that are in effect on July 1, 1993 that limit public ac-
cess to records or meetings shall remain in force, and such laws
apply to records of the legislative and judicial branches , until they
are repealed. Rules of court that are in effect on the date of adop-
tion of this section that limit access to records shall remain in ef-
fect until they are repealed.100
These provisions establish a constitutional right to inspect and
copy legislative, executive, and judicial branch records and only the
Legislature can exempt such records from inspection and copying.
Article I, section 24(d) does, however, grandfather in any rule of
court in existence on July 1, 1993, which “limits public access to rec-
ords.”101 Obviously, such rules are not exclusive because the Legisla-
ture can limit access to judicial records through its exemption power.
Thus, at best, the Florida Supreme Court’s assertions in Ake that the
court has “exclusive constitutional authority” over the clerks of the
circuit court and that the clerk’s records are “governed exclusively by
rule 2.051” were inartfully crafted. At worst, the supreme court
                                                                                                                   
99. Ake, 660 So. 2d at 257.
100. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24 (emphasis added).
101. Id. § 24(d) (emphasis added).
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scoffed at the provisions of article I, section 24 of the Florida Consti-
tution.
Unfortunately, the supreme court avoided an analysis of article I,
section 24, making only one reference to it:
In In re Amendments to Rule of Judicial Administration 2.051—
Public Access to Judicial Records , 651 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1995), this
Court recently implemented article I, section 24, of the Florida
Constitution, by setting forth the openness of court records, the
standards for exemptions, and, in an extensive commentary, an
explanation of the rule’s application.102
This reference to article I, section 24 warrants two observations.
First, there was nothing for the court to “implement.” If a rule of
court was in effect July 1, 1993, then it was grandfathered in by ar-
ticle I, section 24.103 In order to retain significant, though not exclu-
sive, control over its records in 1992, the court, pursuant to In re
Amendments to the Florida Rules Of Judicial Administration—
Public Access to Judicial Records ,104 adopted a rule setting forth ex-
emption provisions.105
Second, the Ake court cited In re Amendments to Rule of Judicial
Administration 2.051—Public Access to Judicial Records 106 as im-
plementing article I, section 24.107 This 1995 case approved amend-
ments to Rule 2.051.108 The original rule was adopted by the Florida
Supreme Court in 1992.109 While provisions that limit access to rec-
ords in the original Rule 2.051 are grandfathered in by article I, sec-
tion 24, it would seem that any of the 1995 amendments that further
limit access to records are invalid.110
Other than stating that Rule 2.051 implemented article I, section
24, the Florida Supreme Court failed to address that section of the
Florida Constitution. As a result, it reached an erroneous conclusion
regarding the applicability of chapter 119, Florida Statutes , to the
                                                                                                                   
102. Ake, 660 So. 2d at 257 (emphasis added).
103. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(d).
104. 608 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1992).
105. See id. at 473. The court, in discussing article I, section 24, said that it
“essentially provides that all records of the judicial branch shall be public except those ex-
empted by Court rule in effect on the date of the adoption of the amendment [creating ar-
ticle I, section 24] or those exempted by the legislature.” Id. at 472 (emphasis added). The
court, at least in 1992, acknowledged that the Legislature has the authority to exempt
judicial branch records. See id.
106. 651 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1995).
107. See Ake, 660 So. 2d at 257.
108. See In re Rule 2.051, 651 So. 2d at 1188.
109. See In re Fla. Rules, 608 So. 2d at 473.
110. The Florida Supreme Court has acknowledged this assertion. In its 1992 In re
Fla. Rules opinion, it stated that “[b]ecause the proposed amendment [creating article I,
section 24] prohibits the Court from later enacting a rule which would close any other rec-
ords, the Court determined to deny such additional requests [for opening additional rec-
ords] at this time.” Id.
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judiciary as a whole, and, more particularly, to the clerks of the cir-
cuit courts as custodians of court records, if, indeed, a literal inter-
pretation of Ake is warranted.
Furthermore, in Ake, the court did not discuss the provision in
article I, section 24(d) of the Florida Constitution, which provides:
“All laws that are in effect on July 1, 1993, that limit public access to
records or meetings shall remain in force, and such laws apply to re-
cords of the legislature and judicial branches until they are re-
pealed.” In order to effectively analyze this provision, one must de-
termine what laws “limit public access to records.”111 To do that, one
must understand “public access.” As early as 1944, the Florida Su-
preme Court, in Fuller v. State ex rel. O’Donnell ,112 held that public
access to records includes the ability of the public to inspect and copy
records.113 Furthermore, article I, section 24, expressly provides for
the right to inspect or copy public records.114 Accordingly, laws that
restrict, impede, or prohibit the public’s ability to inspect or copy
public records would appear to limit public access. Three types of
laws seem to fit this description.
First, laws that govern when and under what conditions records
can be inspected or copied appear to restrict access. Second, fee pro-
visions for inspecting and copying public records may impede and
thus limit public access. For example, a person may want copies of a
number of documents but may simply be unable to pay for such cop-
ies. Third, public records made confidential and/or exempt from
public disclosure restrict access. Accordingly, pursuant to article I,
section 24(d) of the Florida Constitution, these types of laws in effect
on July 1, 1993, are grandfathered in and remain in force and effect
until they are repealed.
This grandfather provision implies that a law limiting public ac-
cess to records of a specific branch of government continues to apply
                                                                                                                   
111. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(d).
112. 154 Fla. 368, 17 So. 2d 607 (1944).
113. See id. at 369, 17 So. 2d at 608. The Fuller court stated:
The best-reasoned authority in this country holds that the right to inspect
public records carries with it the right to make copies. This on the theory that
the right to inspect would in many cases be valueless without the right to
make copies . . . . To say that the agent can deny the right of the stockholder to
inspect and make copies of the records of the corporation would give counte-
nance to the very evil that Jefferson warned against in his famous aphorism,
“Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people alone.
The people themselves are the only safe depositories”. Not only this, to uphold
such a doctrine would make rubbish of the well known trilogy of Abraham Lin-
coln and in place of government of, for, and by the people, we would have gov-
ernment by petty autocrats.
Id. at 369, 17 So. 2d at 607 (citations omitted); see also Winter v. Playa del Sol, Inc., 353
So. 2d 598, 599 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (holding that the right to inspect public records car-
ries with it the right to make copies).
114. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a).
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to that branch. For example, public records exemptions applicable to
the Legislature continue to be applicable to the Legislature.115 This
grandfather provision does not appear to render laws limiting access
to records of one branch of government applicable to the other two
branches of government. However, article I, section 24(d) is more
than just a simple grandfather provision. Its complexity arises by
the additional language providing that “such laws apply to records of
the legislative and judicial branches.”116 Because executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial branch laws limiting access to public records in ef-
fect on July 1, 1993, are grandfathered in with regard to the respec-
tive branch of government, then arguably the phrase “such laws”
references executive branch laws that limit public access to records.
Thus, article I, section 24(d) appears to render executive branch laws
limiting public access to records applicable to the judicial branch.117
Arguably, then, the general fee provisions of chapter 119 are appli-
cable to the judicial branch.
The Florida Supreme Court could have avoided apparent conflict
with article I, section 24, if it had limited the decision in Ake to the
issue of attorneys’ fees under section 119.12, Florida Statutes . The
court could have reached the same result had it held that the provi-
sion was inapplicable to the clerks as custodians of court records be-
cause the judicial branch is not an “agency” affected by section
119.12. Such a holding would not have been contrary to article I,
section 24 because the attorneys’ fees provisions do not “limit public
access” but, to the contrary, encourage public access. Instead, the
court created a great deal of confusion by reaching beyond the attor-
neys’ fees issue and stating that the whole of chapter 119 is inappli-
cable to the judiciary.118
VI.   CONCLUSION
The Legislature has the authority to establish copying fees for
court records despite the confusion fostered by the Florida Supreme
Court’s opinion in Times Publishing Co. v. Ake . Chapter 94-348 cre-
ated section 28.011, Florida Statutes , which provides the definitions
                                                                                                                   
115. A list of public records exemptions for the Legislature can be found in section
11.0431, Florida Statutes. Other statutory provisions are also applicable to legislative rec-
ords. See FLA. STAT. § 15.07 (1997) (providing that the journal of the executive session of
the Senate must be kept free from inspection or disclosure except upon order of the Senate
or a court of competent jurisdiction); id. § 11.26(1)(a) (providing that legislative employees
are forbidden from revealing to anyone outside the area of their direct responsibility the
contents or nature of any request for services made by any member of the Legislature ex-
cept with the consent of the legislator making the request).
116. FLA. CONST. art I, § 24(d) (emphasis added).
117. A discussion of the full ramifications of this assertion is beyond the scope of this
Article.
118. See Times Publ’g Co. v. Ake, 660 So. 2d 255, 257 (1995).
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for official records and public records. In so doing, there was appar-
ently no intent by the Legislature to expand the fee provisions set
forth in section 28.24, Florida Statutes . Nonetheless, the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal in WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken  took the opportunity to
construe House Bill 2481 as grounds for increasing what clerks of
the circuit courts are to charge for court records. This holding does
support, however, the proposition that the Legislature is the branch
of government charged with setting such fees. Accordingly, it is
within the Legislature’s constitutional power to change the fees
charged for court records, just as it has attempted to do in House
bills 1739, 1295, and 39.
The fact that such legislation has failed to pass the Legislature
does not diminish the concerns many have that charging one dollar
per page for copying court records is excessive and not in compliance
with existing statutory provisions or legislative intent. Excessive
fees interfere with a person’s constitutionally guaranteed right to ac-
cess public records. Furthermore, one must compare this fee to the
fifteen cents per page copying fee that agencies are allowed to
charge. This disparity highlights the possible impropriety of the one
dollar fee.
